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Abstract: This paper builds on the author’s earlier work on benchmark dates in 
International Relations. The Introduction summarises this work and explains how 
this paper extends the analysis from suggestions made, but not developed, in earlier 
publications. The second section looks in detail at 20th century benchmark dates centred 
on the three world wars (First, Second and Cold). It argues that the changes clustered 
around the Second World War are both deeper and more extensive than those clustered 
around either the First World War or the Cold War. The third section uses these 
insights to open-up a macro-historical perspective on the 20th century, demonstrating 
the ways in which choices in relation to both time and scale affect the construction 
of macro-historical perspectives. The fourth section demonstrates the advantages of 
a two-century perspective on the 20th century. Here, and in the conclusion, we argue 
that the key issues that underpinned world politics in the 20th century are best seen as 
the downstream consequences of the dynamics and challenges ushered in by the 19th 
century “global transformation.”
Keywords: benchmark dates, the First World War, the Second World War, the 
Cold War
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1. Introduction
This paper builds on earlier work by Buzan and Lawson about how to understand 
benchmark dates in International Relations (IR). 1 That work argued that benchmark 
dates are most fruitfully seen as tipping points within macro-historical processes 
rather than as point-in-time events. In other words, benchmark dates are symbolic 
representations marking clusters of significant changes that may stretch over long 
periods. In this perspective, the benchmark date of 1648 is less about the particulars 
of the Peace of Westphalia than being the tipping point for a wider set of processes, 
namely the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state, which took place in Europe 
during the period between the later 15th century and the early part of the 18th century.
Our earlier work argued that IR’s conventional benchmark dates (1500, 1648, 1919, 
1945 and 1989) were: (a) Eurocentric; (b) overly concerned with major wars and their 
settlements; and (c) insufﬁ ciently attuned to large-scale changes beyond war such as 
major technological advances, ruptures in ideational schemas and revolutions. This bias 
towards European wars and their settlements has led IR to mostly ignore the “global 
transformation” that occurred between 1776 and 1914.2 As a result, IR has adopted a 
faulty historical antenna that, in turn, precludes effective analysis of some of its most 
important issue-areas, from capitalist expansion to debates around sovereignty. To 
rectify this ﬂ aw, we adopted several criteria for identifying signiﬁ cant macro-historical 
change from across a range of IR theories. This generated nine criteria that served as 
candidates for benchmark status:
1. the organizing principle (aka “structure”) of the international system (from 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism);
2. the social organizing principles (aka “the primary institutions of international 
society” – from the English School);
3. the “interaction capacity” 3 of the international system (deﬁ ned as the capacity to 
move goods, people and ideas around the system – from structural realism);
4. the scale of the international system in terms of regular interaction (from realism 
and systems theory);
5. the scale of the international society in terms of its social structure (from the 
English School and constructivism);
6. the occurrence of systemic crises such as major wars, revolutions and economic 
breakdowns (from realism, historical sociology and IPE);
7. changes in the dominant unit of the international system/society (from realism and 
the English School);
8. changes in the distribution of power (aka “polarity” – from realism);
  1  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 437-462; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、[英 ] 乔治 ·劳森 : 《重新思考国际关
系中的基准时间》 (颜震译 ), 载《史学集刊》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 3-19页。
  2  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
  3  Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
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9. changes in the “mode of power,” i.e. basic shifts in how power is constituted, 
organized and expressed (from historical sociology).
In this paper, we use these nine criteria to assess claims for benchmark dates 
within the 20th century. We also build on our earlier contention that it is important 
to differentiate between primary, secondary and tertiary benchmark dates. Primary 
benchmark dates are clusters of events that signify major processes of macro-
historical transformation. Secondary benchmark dates display a lesser cluster of 
signiﬁ cant changes without any being both deep and global. They might be more local 
in influence, or if global in consequence, less significant than primary benchmarks. 
Tertiary benchmark dates are mainly point-in-time events that are not significantly 
clustered with other dynamics and are local/regional rather than global. Given that the 
signiﬁ cance of recent events (such as the end of the Cold War in 1989, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the United States, and the 2008 ﬁ nancial crisis) might look quite different a 
few decades down the line, we have previously proposed a thirty-year moratorium on 
assigning benchmark date status. 4
On this basis, and following the idea that benchmark dates are best seen as tipping 
points identifying a longer period of macro-historical change, our previous work 
proposed a schema consisting of three primary benchmark dates and three secondary 
benchmark dates:
Primary:
●　 1500, representing the opening of the sea lanes between 1487 and 1522;
●　 1860, representing the flowering of the multiple “revolutions of modernity” 
between 1840 and 1870;
●　 1942, representing the multiple crises between 1929 and 1949.
Secondary:
●　 1648, representing the emergence of the sovereign, territorial (but crucially not 
the modern) state between the late 15th century and the early 18th century;
●　 1800, representing the cluster of revolutions and wars between 1776 and the 
1820s;
●　 1916, representing the cluster of wars and revolutions that took place during the 
ﬁ rst two decades of the 20th century.
With the proviso that it was probably “too early to tell,” we also mooted the 
possibility of seeing the First and Second World Wars as a single cluster stretching 
from 1911 to 1949 with a tipping point date of 1931. Such a view is broadly in line 
with those who see the First and Second World Wars as two acts within a single play, 
whether this play is understood as a European civil war or as a way of dealing with the 
  4  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 437-462; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、[英 ] 乔治 ·劳森 : 《重新思考国际关
系中的基准时间》 (颜震译 ), 载《史学集刊》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 3-19页。
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“German problem” .5 This view could potentially be extended to accommodate those 
who see the “short 20th century” as a single period, with its origins in the First World 
War and the associated Bolshevik Revolution, and its end in the formal dissolution 
of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991.6 This view sees the Cold War as part 
of a longer-term systemic struggle, characterised by numerous wars and revolutions, 
perhaps with a tipping point of 1940.
We build on our earlier work in two main ways. First, we examine the extent to 
which the First World War, the Second World War and the end of the Cold War (which 
is only four years away from escaping our self-imposed thirty-year rule) serve as 
benchmark dates according to the nine criteria outlined above. Second, we explore 
the case for periodizing the 20th century via either of the mooted aggregations noted 
above: 1911-1949 (with 1931 as the benchmark date) or 1914-1991 (with 1940 as the 
benchmark date). Our analysis rests on a wager about the current and future shape of 
international society. We argue that the contemporary world is experiencing a transition 
away from a Western-centred world in which the modern “mode of power” was both 
unevenly distributed and highly combined, to a “decentred” world in which the mode 
of power is less unevenly distributed and the world is increasingly and intensely 
combined.7 This perspective agrees that the “short twentieth century” can be usefully 
seen as an aggregation. But it traces this aggregation back to dynamics that emerged 
within the 19th century “global transformation.”
2.  Comparing the Significance of the Three 20th Century IR 
Benchmarks
This section examines the three main 20th century benchmark candidates – 1916, 1942, 
1989 – in light of the nine criteria discussed above. Our aim is to outline the depth, 
intensity and scale of the changes that these dates represent. This, in turn, allows us to 
assess their relative signiﬁ cance as nodal points of transformation and to examine how 
they relate to each other.
2.1 1916
1916 serves as a shorthand for a cluster of changes stretching from the wave of 
“Constitutional Revolutions” that took place in the early part of the 20th century in 
Russia, Iran, Turkey, China and Mexico8 through to the end of the First World War. In 
  5  Paul Preston, “The Great Civil War: European Politics, 1914-1945,” in Tim Blanning, ed., The Oxford History of Modern 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 153-154.
  6  Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London: Penguin, 1994; Mark Mazower, 
Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, London: Penguin, 1999, p. xi.
  7  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations; 
Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentered Globalism,” International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 
2011), pp. 1-23.
  8  Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908,” 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 6 (May 1995), pp. 1383-1447; Charles Kurzman, Democracy Denied, 1905-
1915, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
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our previous work,9 we assigned this date secondary benchmark status because of the 
limited depth and range of the changes that occurred during it.
Few of the criteria drawn from extant IR theories associate this date with 
signiﬁ cant macro-historical changes. There was no transformation in the organizing 
principle of the international system (anarchy), unsurprisingly given that this 
type of change is rare. Likewise, there was no change in the dominant unit of the 
international system/society, which remained the empire/state. Since the system 
was already global in scale, the lack of change in this sphere can be discounted. 
But the lack of change in other areas is more telling. For example, during this 
period there was no signiﬁ cant change in interaction capacity. Steamships, railways 
and up to a point aircraft were all available beforehand. Neither steamships nor 
railways witnessed major innovations during this period. And although aircraft 
did develop quite substantially, especially during the First World War, this was 
not on a scale sufﬁ cient to constitute a major difference. Their range and carrying 
capacity remained limited, and their acceleration in capability did not begin to impact 
interaction capacity until the interwar years.
Nor did the First World War feature significant changes in the mode of power. 
Most of the technologies with which it was fought were available before 1914. Some, 
like aircraft, submarines, and tanks saw rapid developments that made significant 
impacts on war and strategy, but these were within the modern mode of power that was 
established during the 19th century.10 Likewise, changes in the distribution of power 
were modest. The system remained multipolar, and contained more or less the same set 
of great powers after the war as it had done beforehand: seven great powers survived 
of the nine that had existed before, and there were some adjustments in relative weight 
amongst these seven. The Ottoman Empire was the big loser from the war, but was 
the least signiﬁ cant of the great powers anyway. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire also 
disappeared. But Germany suffered only a temporary diminution of its power and 
status. The US gained status, but its rise had been preﬁ gured by earlier developments, 
particularly the “second industrial revolution” of the late 19th century. While the war 
accelerated Britain’s relative decline, it heralded, but did not represent, a power shift 
from Europe to North America.
Perhaps more significant was the change in the scale of international society. The 
disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and the weakening of 
Russia by defeat and revolution, gave birth to an array of new states in East-Central 
Europe and the Middle East (although most of the latter were quickly re-colonised by 
European powers). This change, however, was local to Europe and the Middle East, 
and did not substantially transform the scale of international society.
The Treaty of Versailles is often seen in the IR literature as a signiﬁ cant moment in 
which the inter-war order was established. This is in line with the general approach in 
  9 Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 437-462; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、[英 ] 乔治 ·劳森 : 《重新思考国际关
系中的基准时间》 (颜震译 ), 载《史学集刊》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 3-19页。
10  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations.
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IR to privilege great power war settlements in shaping the structure of international 
order.11 But from an English School perspective there were no major changes in the 
primary institutions of international society. Colonialism, divided sovereignty, great 
power management, nationalism, international law, human inequality, the balance of 
power, territoriality and suchlike all carried on. There was some attempt to restrict 
the right of war, and (secret) diplomacy became a political target, but nothing much 
came of either move. Even from a liberal institutionalist perspective, the changes 
instituted post-Versailles were not particularly signiﬁ cant. The League of Nations, 
often seen as the big innovation during this period, was only an extension, albeit an 
ambitious one, of developments in standing intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
started several decades earlier.12 Although it posed as a global body, the League 
was mainly a Western institution that reflected the ongoing dominance of Western 
empires.13
Despite its huge scale, cost and destruction, therefore, the First World War had 
little impact on the social organizing principles, and not much more on the secondary 
institutions of international society. Perhaps the idea that there should be a standing 
global diplomatic forum in which great power management (ideally) should be 
contained is the major legacy of the war. This leaves the occurrence of systemic crises 
as the main element underpinning the claim of 1916 for benchmark status. The First 
World War was, of course, a major crisis involving huge costs, casualties and economic 
disruption. But as argued above, despite its gravity and scale, in terms of the theoretical 
criteria for signiﬁ cant change, the War did not have a huge number of knock-on effects. 
This period did not contain a major economic crisis other than the War itself. What it 
did contain were several revolutions, including those in China and Russia. The claim 
for a Chinese Revolution in 1911 is, however, suspect. Certainly the Qing dynasty came 
to an end, and republicans claimed the right to govern. But this was more a shift from 
the deteriorating state of the late decades of Qing rule, to the failed state of warlordism 
and civil war of the period from 1911 to 1949.14 There was no transformation from one 
form of government to another, but more a shift from a weak dynasty to an internal 
anarchy in which a weak central government contended with a host of provincial 
warlords. The real revolution in China came with the victory of Mao’s Chinese 
11  E.g. Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace 
and War: Armed Conflict and International Order, 1648-1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Christian 
Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999; John G. Ikenberry, After 
Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2001; Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Ian Clark, International 
Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
12  Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State; Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Jeanne Moreﬁ eld, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the 
Spirit of Empire, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal 
Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
13  Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2009.
14  Jonathan Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850 to the Present, London: 
Penguin, 2013, pp. 119-375.
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Communist Party in 1949, which both asserted strong central control and imposed a 
new form of government.
Arguably, therefore, the Russian revolution was the most important event in this 
cluster. By embedding a new social organizing principle within a powerful state, 
it influenced the make-up of international society for the following seven decades. 
The link between Russian power and socialist ideology transformed the landscape of 
international relations, providing a short-term challenge in the form of the withdrawal 
of Russian forces from the First World War, a medium-term challenge in the provision 
of support for like-minded movements (the Soviet Union invaded Poland in 1920, 
provided aid for German revolutionaries in 1923, supported the republicans during the 
Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939, and helped to install socialist regimes in Europe 
and Asia during the late 1940s), and a long-term challenge in the establishment of a 
systemic alternative to market-democracy.
Beyond the Bolshevik Revolution, perhaps the most important international event of 
this period was the Japanese defeat of Tsarist Russia in 1905. The claim for including 
1905 is that it signalled the arrival of Japan as the ﬁ rst non-white great power. This was 
a stirring event at the time, providing a challenge to Western notions of cultural and 
racial superiority. The global importance of Japan’s victories is captured well by the 
remark made by Alfred Zimmern, perhaps the leading academic-practitioner in British 
turn-of-the-century IR, in reaction to it. Zimmern was due to give a lecture to students 
at Oxford about Greek history, but having heard the news of Japan’s victory, instead 
began his talk by announcing that, “I feel I must speak to you about the most important 
historical event that has happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime: the victory of 
a non-white people over a white people.” 15 This remark does more than just illustrate 
how much force the concept of race had in the early 20th century. It also underlines how 
Japan’s military victories broke the myth of invincible white power established during 
the 19th century by European and American victories over China, the Ottoman Empire 
and many parts of Africa. In so doing Japan gave hope to anti-colonial movements 
around the world.
In retrospect, Japan’s victory stands as the first major move in what is currently 
thought of as ‘the rise of the rest,’ when non-Western societies have harnessed 
industrialization, modern state building and ideologies of progress in indigenous 
conﬁ gurations.16 The wider signiﬁ cance of 1905 is that it marked the end of a period 
in which the West established the contours of a core-periphery international order. 
The inter-societal formations that enabled the emergence and institutionalization of 
this system also contained, paradoxically, the seeds for the rise of such non-Western 
powers. As a result, the particular rise of Japan, as captured in its defeat of Russia, 
portended the general decline of the West. Or to put this in another way, the debate 
about global (as opposed to merely European/Western) power shifts that occupies many 
15  Robert Vitalis, “Birth of a Discipline,” in David Long and Brian Schmidt, eds. Imperialism and Internationalism in the 
Discipline of International Relations, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005, p. 168.
16  Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest, London: Penguin, 2008.
SKNJ.indd   45 2015-6-24   10:03:17
46 Barry Buzan and George Lawson
commentators in the contemporary world has its origins in late 19th century and early 
20th century dynamics. 1905 represents a segue into this wider dynamic, and in a longer 
historical perspective might well turn out to be the most important event within this 
cluster.
2.2 1942
1942 stands as a tipping point in the period between 1929 (the global economic 
crisis) and 1949 (the revolution in China that brought Mao and the CCP to power). 
Buzan and Lawson assigned 1942 primary benchmark status because of the extensive 
depth and range of the changes that it represents.17 As with 1916, there is no change 
in either the organizing principle of the international system or its scale during this 
period. There are, however, signiﬁ cant changes in the other seven criteria outlined 
above.
In terms of interaction capacity, the development of aircraft for both civilian and 
military purposes reached the point where intercontinental range was achieved. Civil 
aviation took off on the back of aircraft technology developed during the Second World 
War, quickly replacing shipping as the main form of international transport for human 
beings and light freight. Such aircraft, with rockets not far behind, opened the prospect 
of air attacks across oceans. Alongside this, the advent of nuclear weapons marked a 
major ratcheting up of destructive power. This was still a change within the new mode 
of power, but one with huge consequences for war and strategy. Nuclear weapons 
changed the utility of war by blurring the distinction between victory and defeat, and 
by opening-up the possibility of human species suicide.
This period also saw major changes in the distribution of power, with a 
transformation from multipolarity to bipolarity. The former European great powers 
and Japan dropped out of the great power ranks, while the Soviet Union and the 
US became superpowers, and China re-emerged as a recognised great power after a 
century of absence. Unlike after the First World War, the social organizing principles 
of international society underwent substantial change. Colonialism and racism (human 
inequality) were formally delegitimized, being replaced as institutions of international 
society by development and human equality/rights respectively.18 Sovereignty became 
based on formal equality, with the exception of the maintenance of great power 
privileges.19 The US succeeded Britain as hegemon and helped to extend the scope 
of liberal international order through secondary institutions such as the UN and the 
introduction of new ﬁ nancial and trade regimes. The UN itself was an upgraded version 
of the League of Nations.
The demise of colonialism had knock-on effects on the dominant unit of international 
society: empires (quite literally) bled away, leaving a greater political uniformity 
17  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 437-462; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、[英 ] 乔治 ·劳森 : 《重新思考国际关
系中的基准时间》 (颜震译 ), 载《史学集刊》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 3-19页。
18  Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
19  Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order.
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in which both former metropoles and former colonies held the status of nation-
states. Decolonization transformed the scale of international society, prompting a 
major increase in its membership, and the rise of the “third world” as a major new 
factor in world politics. During the 1950s and 1960s, membership of Western-global 
international society tripled as the General Assembly ﬁ lled with new states from Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia. Between 1940 and 1980, 81 colonies and 4 quasi-colonies 
became independent states.20 The General Assembly became the expression of the now 
universal institution of sovereign equality.
This period also contained a number of systemic crises. The major financial 
and trading crisis that started in 1929 paved the way to the Second World War via 
breakdowns in liberal economic and political practices, and ideational changes 
including the rise of fascism in three great powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) and up to 
a point in China as Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT became more authoritarian. The 1929 crash 
was followed by Japan’s invasion of Northeast China in 1931 and the expansionism of 
Nazi Germany. By 1942, all the great powers were engaged in a systemic war whose 
outcome hung in the balance. After the war, events ranging from Indian Independence 
to the Chinese Revolution maintained a sense of global tumult. The 1942 cluster thus 
contains changes in the distribution and mode of power, systemic crises, shifts in both 
social organizing principles and the scale of international society, and a change in 
interaction capacity. All things considered, the period around 1942 looks considerably 
more transformational than that around 1916.
2.3 1989
1989 is a point-in-time event (the end of the Cold War) that has become well 
established within IR as a temporal yardstick, separating Cold War from post-Cold War. 
It does not represent a historical cluster, and is still sufﬁ ciently recent to fall within our 
30-year rule. But if 1989 is too close in time to be able to fully assess in terms of its 
long-term signiﬁ cance, this has not stopped the end of the Cold War from structuring 
the way IR is taught and analysed. So how does this benchmark rate in terms of the 
nine criteria for signiﬁ cant change?
The most obvious change associated with 1989 lies in the distribution of power: a 
shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. There is also a relatively minor increase in the scale 
of international society with the addition of the fourteen successor states to the Soviet 
Union, a kind of last gasp of decolonization. But there are few other changes of note, 
except for the end to the ideological challenge offered by the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. In terms of changing the distribution of power and, perhaps, serving notice 
of the end of this ideological confrontation, China’s opening-up in 1978 is beginning to 
look more signiﬁ cant than 1989. Indeed, China’s opening-up marks perhaps the most 
signiﬁ cant change in contemporary world politics: the globalisation of “neo-liberalism.” 
Beginning in the 1970s, neoliberal policies – competitive exchange rates, control of 
the money supply, inflation targets, the reduction of capital and currency controls, 
20  David B. Abernathy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 133.
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lower rates of taxation, and so on – have been instituted around the world. By 2000, 
virtually all states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
had abandoned capital controls.21 From occupying a minor position within policy-
practice circles during the post-World War Ⅱ years, China’s opening-up, followed by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, has seen neoliberalism emerge as a kind of global 
“common sense.” 22
In this way, although: “both academics and policy-makers tend to use 1989 and 
its surrogate frames (such as Cold War/post-Cold War) as the principal normative, 
analytical and empirical shorthand for delineating past and present,” there are many 
parts of the world for which 1989 has little, or uncertain, importance.23 This benchmark 
date relates to a series of changes that looked big at the time, but appear less so the 
further away they get. 1989 has not passed any test more stringent than the end of 
bipolarity and it is questionable how significant that shift is in a longer perspective. 
Indeed, it is looking increasingly likely that China’s opening-up is becoming the “1905” 
of our times, standing as a point-in-time benchmark date for the “rise of the rest” and 
the relative decline of Western power.
This analysis yields a simple conclusion: the 1942 benchmark has signiﬁ cantly more 
depth, spread and scale significance than 1916. Both represent substantial clusters 
of changes, and their ranking as primary (1942) and secondary (1916) benchmark 
dates appears justified. By comparison, 1989 is a rather one-shot event that looms 
large only if observed through the narrow lens of neorealism. In neorealist thinking, 
changes in polarity increase in signiﬁ cance as numbers get smaller. Thus the change 
from bipolarity to unipolarity is, for neorealists, a big deal. And it is why the shift 
from nine to seven great powers during the First World War did not carry as much 
weight. But since this claim is so narrowly based, and not part of a broader cluster of 
transformational events, it seems appropriate to give 1989 only provisional tertiary 
status as a point-in-time event.
3. Should the 20th Century Benchmarks be Aggregated?
Now that we are beginning to get some historical distance from the 20th century, is there 
a case for either of the mooted aggregations: (1905) 1911-1949 (=1931) or (1905) 1911-
1989 (=1940) ? As noted above, we have previously argued that IR has unreﬂ ectively 
fallen into the habit of using the settlements after major great power wars as its 
21  Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power (Vol. 4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 144.
22  Phil Cerny, A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 140.
23  George Lawson, “Introduction: The ‘What’, ‘When’ and ‘Where’ of the Global 1989’,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster 
and Michael Cox, eds., The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010, p. 1.
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benchmark dates,24 and the three 20th century candidates certainly fall into that pattern. 
Proceeding in that manner excludes events such as economic or environmental crises, 
technological breakthroughs, ideational changes, and political and social revolutions 
from consideration as benchmark dates, grossly distorting the question of what it is 
that is important in shaping the main dynamics of international relations. The question 
is therefore whether these three world wars should be thought of as more or less self-
contained clusters of changes, or whether they are part of larger macro-historical 
conﬁ gurations? Thinking along these lines suggests a different approach to assessing 
benchmark dates. In addition to weighing the relative global signiﬁ cance and depth of 
their nested changes, as we did in the previous section, it is also possible to place dates 
within a cluster that represents a speciﬁ c macro-historical conﬁ guration, deﬁ ning the 
signiﬁ cance of dates and events in relation to their roles within that conﬁ guration.
In favour of thinking along these lines is the fact that the earlier, well established 
benchmark dates in IR, when examined more closely, nearly all represent tipping points 
in long running historical processes. Thus, as noted above, 1500 represents the opening 
of the trans-oceanic sea lanes between 1487 and 1522; 1648 represents the emergence 
of the sovereign, territorial state between the late 15th century and the early 18th century; 
1800 represents the cluster of revolutions and wars between 1776 and the 1820s; and 
1860 represents the coming together of the multiple revolutions of modernity between 
1840 and 1870. By this measure, the cluster of changes around a signiﬁ cant benchmark 
date runs from several decades (1500, 1800, 1860) to as much as a couple of centuries 
(1648). By comparison, the 20th century clusters look rather short: eight or fourteen 
years for the 1916 cluster (depending on whether 1905 or 1911 is the starting date), 
twenty years for 1942, and perhaps two or three years for 1989. It is, of course, possible 
that historical development is accelerating, and therefore some compression of major 
benchmark clusters might be natural. But even with this caveat in mind, it is worth 
seeing whether a case can be made for linking the three benchmark dates by framing 
the 20th century in a macro-historical way.
Taking a macro-historical perspective on benchmark dates raises some tricky 
philosophical issues, of which two stand out. First is the problem of linear time. There 
is no doubt that clarity of hindsight increases with distance, yet there is undeniable 
pressure to focus on recent “big” events as turning points. As argued above, 1989 
already has that status in IR with a lot of scholarly debates and teaching organised 
around the idea of “the world since 1989.” For earlier generations of IR students it was 
“the world since 1945” or “the world since 1919.” It may be that the 2008 ﬁ nancial 
crisis will, over time, acquire similar standing. As things stand, the events of 2008 and 
after have primarily impacted on Europe and the United States. However, the ripple 
effects of the crisis are potentially substantial and it may be that these events form part 
of a broader conﬁ guration in which neo-liberalism becomes reduced from orthodoxy 
24  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 437-462; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、[英 ] 乔治 ·劳森 : 《重新思考国际关
系中的基准时间》 (颜震译 ), 载《史学集刊》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 3-19页。
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into one amongst a range of capitalist assemblages.25 As we note above, it is also 
possible to see the ﬁ nancial crisis, like the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, as part of 
a broader range of processes that mark the relative decline of Western power. Yet given 
the relatively short distance that separates us from these events, there is no reliable way 
of assessing how important they are, at least not for the time being.
Consider as another example— the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. 
These attacks clearly had a major impact at the time. First reactions encompassed the 
spectacular nature of the attacks and the gut-wrenching empathy for the passengers 
on the planes and the people inside the target buildings. Second thoughts turned to 
the strategic and tactical genius the attacks represented: a novel mode of attack that 
exposed huge opportunities for violence within modern transportation systems. 
That this genius was linked to a Hollywood-class villain simply heightened the 
drama. Then there was the unsettling fact that a non-state actor had successfully 
attacked the world’s most powerful state. The formal US response treated the attack 
as a declaration of war, elevating the status of its opponent and suggesting that the 
deﬁ ning activity of international relations was no longer inter-state relations. Such a 
response led to questions over the status of sovereignty as the core organizing principle 
of international society. In its own terms and times, 9/11 thus looked like a very big 
event.
And yet if we shift our imaginations a century into the future and look back at 2001, 
what will we see? Perhaps 9/11 will stand as the point when states surrendered their 
claim to exercise monopoly control over the use of force. If substantial attacks by non-
state actors become a regular feature of the coming decades, and especially if these 
escalate to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, then 
9/11 will indeed warrant macro-historical standing. But other scenarios are equally, 
perhaps more, likely. 9/11 might turn out to be a one-off event with states reasserting 
control over, and ownership of, war. The ultra-violence of extremist groups may limit 
their ability to expand or even endure as signiﬁ cant actors. The threat from non-state 
actors might get brushed aside by other developments such as the rise of China and 
India, which could create new rounds of great power competition. An environmental 
crisis such as a substantial rise in sea levels might become the world’s central security 
concern. Machine intelligence might become powerful and pervasive enough to change 
how human life on the planet operates. In these scenarios, one hundred years from now 
9/11 would appear as a footnote within a wider historical optic. We should therefore 
be cautious about how we understand and signify events, and that caution should be 
greater when the event in question is recent. Over time, the meaning and signiﬁ cance of 
events change. This is also likely to be the case for 9/11.
The second philosophical issue raised by the relationship between benchmark dates 
25  Saskia Sassen, “The Return of Primitive Accumulation,” in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox, eds., The 
Global 1989, pp. 51-75; Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order,” International Affairs, 
Vol. 90, No. 1 (January 2014), pp. 71-91; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、〔英〕乔治 ·劳森 : 《资本主义与新兴世界秩序》, 载《国际
安全研究》, 2014年第 1期 , 第 78-100页。
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and macro-historical enquiry lies in the scale of temporal perspective that is adopted. 
If one takes a very long view, then many events that look big in their own time recede 
into the background. The Cold War may look no more consequential in the long run 
of things than the Peloponnesian War, or the Punic Wars, or Hideyoshi’s attempts to 
conquer Korea and Ming China. Nuclear weapons may look like just another instance 
of military innovation similar to iron swords, war chariots, compound bows and 
gunpowder weapons. In the very long-run perspective, and assuming that humankind 
goes on to become a space-faring species, the outstanding event of the 20th century 
might turn out to be the launching of the first human being into orbit: Yuri Gagarin 
in 1961. It is easy to imagine an event like that living for millennia in the collective 
imagination of humankind. Yet seen from 2015, in the narrow framing of where we are 
now and where we might be in the next ten or twenty years, such events provide little 
more than diverting background to IR’s core concerns.
In this sense, the scale of perspective that is adopted shapes the nature of the 
narrative that goes with it, and it is the narrative that makes particular events seem 
either important or unimportant. A narrative with a perspective of a million years 
would have as its main dynamic the evolution and spread of humankind, and feature 
benchmark dates based on migration events and evolutionary landmarks in human 
intelligence. One with a perspective of 5000 years would be primarily concerned with 
the rise and fall of civilizations, and feature benchmark dates based around this theme. 
On these mega-macro scales, the three benchmark candidates in the 20th century would 
not register strongly. But a grand narrative with a perspective of 500 years would have 
as its central concern the rise of the West to global dominance. And such a perspective 
is likely to feature prominently the 20th century events we have discussed.
4.  Contextualizing the 20th Century in the 19th Century Global 
Transformation
All in all, therefore, too long a perspective reduces most contemporary events to 
insignificance; while too short a perspective provides insufficient depth of context 
to bring the relevant macro-historical configuration into view. On this basis, we 
propose to contextualise the three 20th century benchmarks by examining them from 
a perspective of two centuries. This perspective features the revolutions of modernity 
that transformed the world during the “long 19th century” (the period between 1776 
and 1914). Its core dynamic is a complex, intertwined set of revolutions – economic, 
military, political, social, legal, scientiﬁ c and technological – that remade the material 
and ideational character of international order. Because the story of this “global 
transformation” is told in detail elsewhere,26 we offer only a brief summary here. 
The key argument is that the main parameters of modern international relations, 
26  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International 
Relations. 
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both material and ideational, were established during the 19th century, and that what 
has happened since then can be understood as a working out of the dynamics and 
challenges set in motion at that time. This perspective should enable us to see whether, 
and how, the three 20th century benchmarks might be linked together within the wider 
theme of the unfolding of the “global transformation.”
In material terms, the “small planet” that we are familiar with today emerged 
during the 19th century. From the 1830s onwards, the steamship, the railway and the 
telegraph integrated the continents. The movement of goods (bulk trade), people 
(mass migration), military power (colonization, world war) and information (news, 
military and economic command and control) became quick, reliable and relatively 
cheap, and humankind became connected into a tightly integrated, interdependent 
global political economy. In ideational terms, four modern ideologies of progress – 
liberalism, socialism, nationalism and “scientiﬁ c” racism – came to dominate concerns 
about identity, status and legitimacy. These four ideologies dominated the ideational 
landscape of the 20th century. With the possible exception of environmentalism, no idea 
of similar weight or transformational consequence has arisen since.27
The ﬁ rst durable ﬂ owering of these multiple revolutions took place in a handful of 
Western societies, even if these revolutions were enabled by international dynamics 
ranging from imperialism to capitalist accumulation. Consequently, a large power 
gap opened up between a small group of “core” polities, and a much larger group of 
“peripheral” polities. That a relatively small country like Britain was able to occupy India 
and inﬂ ict military defeat on China, the two longstanding centres of the world economy, 
shows just how important this power gap was. And because the gap relied on a new mode 
of power, it was very difﬁ cult to close. In principle the power gap could be closed: those 
with access to the conﬁ guration that sustained the global transformation could move from 
periphery to core. In practice, this move was made exceptionally difﬁ cult not only by 
the depth of the transformative package, but also by practices of imperialism and other 
forms of coercive interventionism that reinforced the advantages of the core.
The result of these dynamics is captured well by the idea of uneven and combined 
development (UCD).28 During the 19th century, development became both more 
intensely uneven (because of the gap opened up by the new mode of power) and 
more intensely combined (because imperialism, the extension of the market and 
improvements in physical interaction capacity saw the core establish its authority 
around the world). While uneven and combined development has been a longstanding 
feature in human history,29 the revolutions of modernity both intensified unevenness 
27  Only fascism might qualify, and that is best seen as a synthesis of extreme nationalism and “scientiﬁ c” racism.
28  Justin Rosenberg, “Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development Part II: Unevenness and 
Multiplicity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 165-189; Justin Rosenberg, 
“Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy in the Mirror of Uneven and Combined Development,” International Politics, 
Vol. 50, No. 2 (March 2013), pp. 183-230.
29  Justin Rosenberg, “Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development Part II: Unevenness and 
Multiplicity,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 165-189; Justin Rosenberg, 
“Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy in the Mirror of Uneven and Combined Development,” International Politics, 
Vol. 50, No. 2 (March 2013), pp. 183-230.
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between polities and, for the first time, tied the world into a single system. On the 
one hand, those convinced of their cultural superiority and with access to advanced 
weapons, industrial production, medicine and new forms of bureaucratic organization 
gained a pronounced advantage over those with limited access to these sources 
of power. On the other hand, both core and peripheral polities became deeply 
integrated into a single world system: economically, politically and militarily. 
During the global transformation, degrees of combination intensiﬁ ed both because 
of technological breakthroughs (such as steamships, railways and electronic means 
of communication from the telegraph to the internet) and social practices (such as 
imperialism, colonialism and the expansion of capitalism to global scale). The global 
transformation produced both homogenization and differentiation simultaneously.
The global transformation unleashed the dynamics that characterize much 
contemporary world politics. In broad-brush terms, what we see is a three-stage process 
in which the dynamics of UCD and the core-periphery structure work themselves out. 
In the ﬁ rst stage, which runs up until 1945, the core maintains the gap between itself 
and the periphery in the form of what can be labelled: Western-colonial international 
society. This featured divided sovereignty and a set of competing empires each with a 
core modern state as its metropole. During this phase, the core expanded somewhat as 
Germany, the US, France, and to a lesser extent Russia and Italy followed Britain’s lead 
and acquired the modern mode of power. Notably Japan joined the ranks of the great 
powers, outpacing many societies within the West. Japan also followed the 19th century 
“standard of civilization” by generating its own empire. As noted above, the rise of 
Japan to great power status caused alarm in the West, and the country became caught 
up in the great power wars of the 20th century. This, however, hides its true signiﬁ cance: 
a century before Zakaria coined the notion of “the rise of the rest,” 30 Japan, a non-
western polity, had made the opening move to come to terms with the revolutions of 
modernity and began closing the power gap that emerged during the 19th century.
The second stage of the global transformation can be labelled: Western-global 
international society. This stage ran from 1945 until the early 21st century; it is possible, 
as discussed above, that the ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008 will become the benchmark date 
that signiﬁ es the closing of this stage. The main features of Western-global international 
society were that, while the Western core (plus Japan) remained dominant, its grip 
began to weaken. Slowly and patchily, substantial parts of “the rest” begin to find a 
way of coming to terms with the revolutions of modernity. In East Asia, Japan was 
joined by South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. During the 1980s, China began to take 
off on its remarkable development; India began to do so during the 1990s. Other states, 
from Turkey to Brazil and from Mexico to Indonesia, also came to signify this process. 
Yet these dynamics took place within a global political economy still largely structured 
by the West and this structure, especially its relative openness regarding trade and 
investment, played a substantial role in the ongoing spread of modernity. The West still 
30  Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest.
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maintained signiﬁ cant, though diminishing, power advantages, and international society 
was still largely framed in Western terms.
In the early years of the 21st century, the “rise of the rest” is (slowly and patchily) 
expanding the core and spreading the revolutions of modernity ever wider. This, in 
turn, means that the dynamic of uneven and combined development is taking on a new 
shape. Rather than being highly combined and highly uneven, as was the case during 
the first two stages of the global transformation, UCD is now highly combined, but 
becoming notably less uneven. This points towards a third stage that might be labelled: 
decentered globalism. This stage is still emergent, but the direction in which UCD 
is unfolding suggests three defining features: no superpowers, a narrow ideological 
bandwidth, and an ever-higher degree of combination.
First, the trend towards lower levels of unevenness in the distribution of power means 
that this will be a world without superpowers.31 Although superpowers seem natural to 
modern IR, they are not. The age of superpowers was a particular consequence of the 
highly uneven distribution of power created by the Western-colonial phase of global 
modernity and sustained during its Western-global phase. During these two periods, 
states like Britain and the US amassed sufﬁ cient relative power to be world dominating. 
That level of capability is no longer possible. With many states becoming wealthy 
and powerful, no single polity will be able to accumulate sufﬁ cient relative power to 
dominate international society. Even giants such as China and India will be hemmed 
in both by the rise of each other and other states. Nor are the established powers going 
away. There will be no modern “fall of Rome.” The US will remain primus inter pares 
for some considerable time to come and, whatever their current troubles, the European 
Union and Japan will remain substantial centres of power, wealth and influence. 
Superpowers should, therefore, be seen as a corollary of an international order deﬁ ned 
by the ﬁ rst two stages of the global transformation. From having two superpowers in 
the Cold War period, we are now down to one whose position and legitimacy look 
increasingly tenuous. The rise (perhaps better seen as the return) of new powers will 
close the window in which superpowers have been a core component of international 
relations. The world of decentred globalism will have several great powers and many 
regional powers; it will not have any superpowers.
The second dynamic is the emergence of a relatively narrow ideological bandwidth 
compared with the deep divisions of the 20th century. All of the great powers are now 
committed to maintaining a global capitalist economy.32 Potentially, this provides a 
new foundation for strengthening international society by constructing a “concert” of 
capitalist powers. Such a development would require a focus on the powerful shared 
interests all states have in maintaining the functioning of the global economy and 
dealing with its many inequities. It would also require a pluralist tolerance of political 
31  Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentered Globalism,” International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 
2011), pp. 1-23.
32  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1 (January 
2014), pp. 71-91; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、〔英〕乔治 ·劳森 : 《资本主义与新兴世界秩序》, 载《国际安全研究》, 2014年第
1期 , 第 78-100页。
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differences, because although all (or almost all) contemporary states are capitalist, they 
remain divided between democratic and authoritarian forms of governance, and this 
division looks to be durable.33
Finally, the trend of increasing levels of combination seems unstoppable. By 
combination, we mean high levels of economic and societal interdependence, and 
increasingly “shared fates” (from the operation of the global economy to climate 
change). This, of course, suggests an intensification of global politics, and probably 
a larger role for both IGOs and non-state actors. Quite how this tension between 
pluralising and globalising imperatives will play out is difﬁ cult to predict, but that it 
will be a main axis of world politics seems probable.
What, then, does this two-century narrative focused on the global transformation 
mean for 20th century benchmark dates? The ideas of Preston, Mazower and Hobsbawm 
noted above (regarding a 1914-1945 European civil war, a 1917-1989 era of ideological 
struggle, and a “short 20th century” shoehorned between World War One and the end 
of the Cold War respectively) retain a degree of resonance. But none captures the 
whole picture either in terms of the scale of the transformation or the range of factors 
that it illuminates. In the perspective of the global transformation, we are living within 
a threefold working out of dynamics that were established during the 19th century: of 
core-periphery structure; of great powers, and of ideologies of progress. While the new 
mode of power unleashed by the global transformation gave core states great advantages 
over those in the periphery, it also destabilized relationships between the great powers 
by exposing them to the relentless insecurity of permanent and rapid changes in the 
technologies of military power.34 How would the great powers deal with this, especially 
once the international system became “closed,” as was the case by the end of the late 19th 
century by which time virtually all the globe’s territory was occupied or colonized?35 
And how were the four ideologies of progress to be reconciled? Liberalism, socialism, 
nationalism and “scientiﬁ c” racism contained huge contradictions among themselves – there 
was no way they could be forged into a single package. The 20th century thus became 
the time in which the contradictions of the global transformation were confronted and 
the ﬁ rst resolutions to these contradictions were formulated.
The working out of the core-periphery structure opens with Japan’s defeat of Russia 
in 1905, which as noted above stands as a symbolic date marking the “rise of the rest.” 
Japan struck a blow against “scientific” racism by showing both that white power 
was not invincible, and that non-white peoples could acquire the multiple revolutions 
33  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, “Capitalism and the Emergent World Order,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 1 (January 
2014), pp. 71-91; 〔英〕巴里 ·布赞、〔英〕乔治 ·劳森 : 《资本主义与新兴世界秩序》, 载《国际安全研究》, 2014年第
1期 , 第 78-100页。
34  Barry Buzan and George Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International 
Relations.
35  Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975; Halford Mackinder, 
“The Geographical Pivot of History,” in Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, Washington, DC: National 
Defence University, 1996, pp. 175-194.
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of modernity. Japan struck a blow against Western imperialism, but not against 
imperialism as such, a practice it took up with relish. After 1945, the delegitimation 
of “scientific” racism and colonialism opened the way to large-scale decolonization. 
The core gave up its right to occupy the periphery and extended as norms – and to a 
considerable extent as practices – the rights of sovereign and human equality. But even 
after decolonization, few polities matched Japan’s acquisition of the revolutions of 
modernity. Only Korea and Taiwan Region, and Singapore, managed to achieve high 
levels of capitalist development by the 1980s. In the late 1970s, China’s shift to “reform 
and opening up” marked the beginning of a more systematic “catching up,” so much so 
that, by the ﬁ rst decade of the 21st century, the world appeared to be moving towards 
a condition of decentred globalism. As mooted above, it may be that, over time, 2008 
will emerge as the tipping point for a wider shift in global economic power.
The working out of great power competition perhaps also began in 1905 when 
Japan’s surprise defeat of Russia showed how quickly “modernizing missions” could 
upset the balance of power. Japan’s victory opened the way to a period of ferocious 
great power wars, supporting Preston’s idea of seeing the First and Second World Wars 
as a single event. At the beginning of this period there was a close link between great 
power dynamics and those that took place between core-periphery polities. Industrial 
great powers could use their power advantage to build or expand empires, and those 
empires in turn increased their standing against other great powers. Lenin’s idea of 
intensifying capitalist competition to divide and re-divide the world remains a useful 
characterisation of this process.36 From competitive empire-building, it was not a great 
leap for some great powers to also attempt to pursue the kind of global hegemony 
that Britain enjoyed for a time during the mid-19th century when it was the only fully-
ﬂ edged industrial power. The result was not so much a European civil war as it was 
a knockout process amongst the great powers. Europe was the main location for this 
process because it was where most of the then great powers were concentrated. By 
1945, the knockout process had eliminated all of the small great powers (which, like 
Britain, were great more because of their acquisition of the modern mode of power 
rather than because of their territorial and population size). The arrival of nuclear 
weapons empowered the “defense dilemma” in which the destructiveness of modern 
weapons outgrew the societies that wielded them with the consequence that fear of war 
began to outweigh fear of defeat.37 Only two superpowers were left, and after 1989 this 
was reduced to one by the implosion of the Soviet Union, albeit with China and India 
beginning to appear as major great powers.
Although, as ongoing tensions between the US and China signify, great power 
competition has not come to an end in the contemporary world, the 20th century has 
seen some signiﬁ cant resolutions of it. Empire building is no longer acceptable in its 
traditional sense, although quite where the boundary is between empire and forms of 
36  Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.
37  Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Colchester: 
ECPR Press, 2007, pp. 217-233.
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regional hegemony is a thorny question. Russia has not given up either imperial ways 
of thinking or attempts to recover some of its former territories. Quite what China has 
in mind with its assertion of regional primacy is unclear. Wars between nuclear-armed 
great powers are no longer thought of as rational, and the idea that any one power might 
seek global hegemony becomes ever more irrational as the system moves towards 
decentred globalism. Great powers still wield big military clout, yet increasingly their 
standing and status rest not on war-making, but on how well they build regional and 
global level international societies.
The working out of ideologies of progress more or less ﬁ ts with Mazower’s framing 
of 1917-1989 and Hobsbawm’s notion of the short 20th century. The consequence of 
the First World War was to push dynasticism to the margins and to elevate socialism 
and fascism as forms of state power. The Second World War delegitimized “scientiﬁ c” 
racism and fascism, but left nationalism intact. The Cold War pitched state socialism 
against both liberal and social democracy, with nationalism remaining legitimate across 
the board. China’s turn away from the economics of state socialism, along with the 
breakup of the Soviet Union between 1989-1991, marked a further stage within this 
process. By the 1990s, therefore, the ﬁ rst working out of the ideational contradictions 
of modernity was more or less in place. Nationalism was the big winner, and “scientiﬁ c” 
racism the big loser. Economic liberalism was also a big winner, because most states 
around the world accepted that, like it or not, capitalism provided a potent means 
of acquiring wealth and power. But the political and cultural aspects of liberalism 
remained contested, even if they were also highly influential. Socialism remained 
intellectually energetic, not least because it retained a powerful analysis of capitalism 
and its inequities. But because of its inability to solve the inefﬁ ciencies of bureaucratic 
administration and corruption, or, as the fate of the Soviet Union showed, socialism 
cannot compete effectively with capitalism over the long-term.
By 1989, therefore, we can speak of an initial working out of the ideological 
tensions ﬁ rst established during the 19th century. To say this is not to suggest any kind 
of “end of history.” Strong tensions remain between nationalism, with its inclination 
towards territoriality, and liberalism, with its inclination towards globalism and 
deterritorialization. The old tension between democratic and authoritarian modes of 
government, which transcends the coming of modernity, also remains live, despite 
the seemingly victory of capitalism. Capitalism, like nationalism and socialism, is 
comfortable with democratic or authoritarian forms of governance. Like religion, the 
authoritarian-democratic tension has been revitalized by the global transformation, 
and both remain significant elements in the ideational landscape of the 21st century. 
Even the biggest winner of the past century – capitalism – has not solved its endemic 
problems: periodic crises and high levels of inequality, which threaten political stability 
in many parts of the world.38
38  Capitalism’s dependence on maintaining high levels of growth in order to offset the political effects of inequality points to 
issues of environmental sustainability. Environmental stewardship might thus become the ﬁ rst post-modern big idea since the 
19th century to join the ideational matrix of the global political economy.
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5. Conclusions
The picture of the 20th century that emerges from this analysis is one of transformation 
and crisis. At the start of the century, uneven development is particularly extreme; in the 
contemporary world, it appears to be heading towards the kind of leveling out that was 
normal before the global transformation. During the same period, levels of combination 
have become far more intense. The dynamic of permanent and rapid technological 
innovation unleashed during the early 19th century shows no sign of coming to an 
end, and in that sense both combined development and rapid technological innovation 
have become the permanent background against which other dynamics operate. One 
consequence of this development is the end of world wars as a rational way of pursuing 
great power politics.
If one sees the 20th century in this way, then it conﬁ rms the pivotal importance of 
the cluster of benchmark dates stretching from 1929-1949, while making clear that 
this cluster does not stand alone. Rather, this period is intimately linked to the other 
two IR benchmark dates for the 20th century. And these links are, in turn, related to 
the 19th century global transformation through three main dynamics: a core-periphery 
order; great power dynamics; and ideologies of progress. Over time, it may be that 
1978 serves as a useful tipping point date by which to represent these dynamics. By 
then, most of the resolutions noted above were either in place or becoming the most 
likely outcome. Although there is a good case for choosing neutral symbolic dates 
for benchmarks, this one pegs neatly to China’s landmark decision for reform and 
opening up. In its own way, this was as important to the overall dynamics of the global 
transformation as Japan’s defeat of Russia in 1905. Both work to illustrate the shift 
from a world that was, but no longer is, dominated by the West.
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